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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
SEABOARD FINANCE COMPANY, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Appellant, 
-vs.-
HOWARD G. WAHLEN, and 
BARBARA M. WAHLEN, 
· · Respondents. 
Case No. 
7890 '"',' 
Appellant's Brief 
In the above entitled action plaintiff is the appellant 
and appeals from a judgment rendered in the above 
cause. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was brought by the plaintiff in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for the C.ounty of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah, on a promissory note and chattel 
mortgage executed by the _d~fendants Ho.ward.G. Wahlen 
and Barbara M. Wahlen in favor of the plaintiff. Said 
note and mortgage were dated the 2nd day of July 1951. 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The face of said note is the sum of Thirteen Hundred 
Seventy Eight and 38/100 Dollars ($1,378.38), and is 
payable to plaintiff in 24 monthly· installments of $57.44 
each. 
The case came on for pre-trial hearing upon the 
complaint and answer of the parties, and the court made 
and entered its original and amended findings of facts 
and conclusions of law upon the issue and defense raised 
by the defendant's answer, to-wit: tJ sury; and there-
upon entered judgment in favor of defendants. From 
the court's judgment in favor of defendants the plaintiff 
takes this appeal. 
The findings of facts and conclusions of law made 
and entered by the court as amended by stipulation of 
counsel and ordered by the court (Item 14 of the desig-
nation of record as amended by item 19) are as follows: 
(Tr. P. 11, 12, 20) 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That· at ·an times mentioned the plaintiff was 
a Corporation duly organized and operating by 
virtue of the Laws of the State of Utah and was 
engaged in the business of loaning money as an 
Industrial Loan Corporation. 
2. That on or about the 2nd- day of July, 1951, 
the defendants applied to the plaintiff for a loan 
in an amount sufficient to give them net c.ash 
proceeds of at least $1,000.00 "rhich was to be 
repaid within 24 months.· ' 
3. That OJ?- the 1st day of July 1951 the defend-
ants· rec-eived · fro·m the plai~tiff · t.he ·. sum ·of 
.2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
$1,000.00 and the sum of $20.00 as value received 
by "~ay of an Insurance Policy, the premium of 
$20.00 "~hich was advanced by plaintiff, and there-
upon executed a note in the sum of $1,378.38, pay-
able to the plaintiff in 24 equal installments of 
$57.44 each installment. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the 
Court makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the loan by the plaintiff is usurious and 
the defendant is entitled to a judgment of No 
Cause of Action. 
Thereupon judgment was entered in favor of de-
fendants (Tr. P. 8). 
At the pre-trial hearing the 'facts were discussed 
and briefs were ordered to be submitted ·by respective 
counsel upon the following issue : 
Whether the basis for applying the interest and 
charges allowed by the statute is the sum of $1020.00 
or $1378.38. 
In addition to the facts which were included in the 
court's final findings of fact as set forth above; the fol-
lowing facts were stipulated to bet,veen counsel at the 
pre:-tria_l. 
a. That the· Banking Co.inmissioner of the State of 
Utah would testify that the computation· of. the 
·.3 
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interest and charges made on the note involved 
herein conformed to the law and regulations of 
the State of Utah. 
b. That an officer of the plaintiff would testify that 
plaintiff relied on defendant's statement in the 
note as to his ownership of the mortgaged 
chattels. 
Said stipulations were set forth on page one of 
plaintiff's answer brief submitted to the trial court as 
referred to above, (Tr. P. 29), and were not controverted 
by defendants. Said two stipulations were included in 
plaintiff's proposed findings of fact, (Tr. P. 9A, 9B), 
but the trial court refused to include said stipulated 
facts in its amended findings on the ground that they 
were immaterial. This is one of the grounds upon which 
• 
this appeal is ~aken. 
Following the entry of the judgment in favor of 
defendant and against plaintiff, the latter made a motion 
to. amend the same and to enter judgment in favor of 
plaintiff (Tr. P. 10). This motion was heard by the trial 
court and resulted in certain corrections being made to 
the Findings (Tr. P. 11).· The Court, ho,vever, refused 
to adopt all of plaintiff's proposed Findings and further 
refused to amend its judgment. From the order of the 
Court refusing to amend its original Judgment and enter 
Judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants 
this a ppea1 is also taken. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. THE COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINA-
TION IN ITS JUDGMENT THAT "THE ONLY 
ISSUE IN THE CASE WAS 'VHETHER THE LOAN 
BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS USURIOUS''. 
2. THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS 
A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE LOAN BY THE 
PLAINTIFF TO THE DEFENDANTS WHEREBY 
''THE DEFENDANTS RECEIVED FROM THE 
PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF $1,000.00, AND THE SUM 
OF $20.00 AS VALUE RECEIVED BY WAY OF AN 
INSURANCE POLICY", WAS USURIOUS. 
3. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THAT THE BASIS OF COJ\fPUTING INTEREST 
AND CHARGES UPON THE LOAN IN QUESTION 
WAS THE SUM OF $1,378.38, THE FACE AMOUNT 
OF S~~ID LOAN. 
4. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
~lAKE FINDINGS OF FACTS AS PROPOSED IN 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACTS. 
5. TI-IE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
~t\.MEND ITS JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAIN-
TIFF. 
6. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF 
AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS. 
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ARGUMENT 
Points 1 2 and 3 will be presented and discussed 
' ' 
together for the purpose of argument. 
POINT 1. TI-IE COURT ERRED IN ITS DE-
TERMINATION IN ITS JUDGMENT THAT ''THE 
ONLY ISSUE IN THE CASE WAS WI-IETHER THE 
LOAN BY THE PLAINTIFF WAS USURIOUS''. 
POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUD-
ING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE LOAN 
BY THE PLAINTIFF TO THE DEFENDANT 
WHEREBY "THE DEFENDANTS RECEIVED 
FROM THE PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF $1,000.00, 
AND THE SUJ\1: OF $20.00 AS VALUE RECEIVED 
BY WAY OF AN INSURANCE POLICY WAS 
USURIOUS. 
- "POINT 3. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO FIND THAT THE BASIS OF COMPUTING IN-
TEREST AND CHARGES UPON THE LOAN IN 
QUE-STION WAS THE SUM OF $1,378.38 THE FACE 
AMOUNT OF SAID LOAN. 
Section 7-6-3, Utah Code .A .. nnotated 1943, as amended 
by the Laws of 1945, Chapter 73, provides the following 
with regard to the powers of an Industrial Loan Cor-
poration: 
"Every Industrial Loan Corporation shall have 
power: 
( 1) To loan money on the personal undertaking 
of the borrower and other persons, or on personal 
-6 
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8eeurity, or other,vise, and to deduct interest 
thereon IN ADVANCE at the rate of one per 
cent or less of the FACE OF SUCH LOAN per 
month, and, in addition, to require payment in 
uniform "~eekly, semimonthly or monthly install-
ments, "Tith or \Yithout an allowance of interest 
on such installments, and to charge a fee of $2 or 
less_ on loans of $100 or less and a maximum fee 
of t\YO per cent on loans in exc.ess of $100 for ex-
pense in examining and investigating the char-
acter and circumstances of the borrower; pro-
vided, that such examining and investigating fee 
shall not be assessed to any borrower more often 
than once in each six month period, and provided 
further that no charge shall be collected unless a 
loan shall have been made." (Emphasis supplied). 
This court in the case of People's Finance and Thrift 
Co. vs. Varney, 75 Utah 355, 285 Pac. 304, construed and 
applied the provisions of Chapter 116, Laws of Utah 
1925, which is the same as Section 7-6-3, Utah Code 
Annotated 1943 as amended, except that the 1925 act 
provided for 12% per annum in place of 1% per month 
provided by the present act. Also the· Code has been 
amended by the 1945 Act in a minor respect not material 
here with regard to charging but one investigation fee 
in earh six month period. 
In the Varney case, the plaintiff was also an Indus·-
trial Loan Company operating under the Laws of the 
State of Utah. In that case the plaintiff in making the 
loan deducted from the $200.00 face of the note $2.00 as 
and for an investigating fee and $20.00 interest in ad-
vance, and paid to Varney the balance of $178.00. The 
loan involved 'vas for a period of 10 months and interest 
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was charged accordingly. Also an investigation fee of 
$2.00 was charged in lieu of the authorized amount of 
$4.00 collection which could have been charged under 
the statute. Upon a claim of usury being raised by the 
defendant Varney, the court rendered a judgment against 
the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff, which judg-
ment was affirmed by this court on appeal. This Court 
stated: 
'' ... The face of the note is $200. . .. So far 
as material, it provides that the defendants 
promised to pay to the order of the plaintiff $200 
'in ten installments of $20.00 each' ... " (Page 
356) 
''As is seen . . . When the ref ore the company 
deducted 12 per cent per annum as it did on the 
face of the note, as interest in advance for the 10 
month period of the loan, it but did what the 
statute expressly authorized such a company to 
do. The interest deducted was $20.00, which is 
the interest on $200.00 for a period of ten months 
at. the rate of 12 per cent per annum. When the 
company 'in addition' required the loan to be 
paid in monthly installments of· $20.00 each, it 
again but did what the statute expressly permitted 
such a company to do. Such, we think, is not only 
the reasonable, but the necessary, meaning to be 
given the statute. we do not see wherein it in 
such respect is doubtful or uncertain." (Page 360) 
(Emphasis supplied) 
On the point as to an apparent conflict between the 
1925 Statute and the .General Usury Statute, the court 
at Page 361 of the Varney case held that the General 
Usury Statute must .give way to the 1925 Act and de-
' scribed the 1925 Act as a ''special and subsequent act, 
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and 'Yhich expressly repeals all }a.,v·s 1n conflict there-
,, .. ith. '' 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the compu-
tation of interest "Tas based upon the face of the note 
""hich as stated by the court 'vas $200.00. The Court 
further emphasized and identified the sum of $200.00 as 
being the face of the note by commenting that said 
amount was the amount promised by the defendants to 
be repaid ''in ten installments of $20.00' '. 
From the foregoing it is apparent that the charges 
authorized by the statute and approved by the Supreme 
Court in the Varney case were based upon the face 
amount of the note which 'vas the amount sho,vn on the 
face of the document as being the amount to be repaid, 
and not the amount which was actually received by the 
borrower. The Court further expressly approved the 
act of the plaintiff in 'vithholding "in advance" the 
charges made, and stated that the plaintiff's "but did 
\Vhat the statute expressly authorized such a company 
to do". 
X o'v in the present case, as in the Varney case, the 
plaintiff but did 'vhat the ·statute expressly authorized 
such a company to do, to-wit: upon the application by the 
defendants ''for a loan in an amount sufficient to give 
them net cash proceeds of at -least $1,000.00 which was 
to be repaid 'vi thin 24 months," as set forth in para-
graph two of the Findings of Fact as stipulated (Page 
20 of the Transcript of Record) a computation was made 
which resulted in the figure of $1,378.38 as being the 
face amount of the loan, which 'vhen reduced by the 
.9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
. l : 
charges authorized by this statute, "rould leave a balance 
as required by the defendants. The addition of $20.00, 
advanced by the plai.ntiff as_~ pr,emium for an ins"ura~ce 
policy_-~_a_u~.l~~~t~~iy_~d by .the defendants in addition 
to the $1,000.00 as set forth in paragraph three of the 
Findings of Fact. 
In brief, the computation formula contemplated a 
total of interest at one per cent per month for the 24 
month period of the note, plus the two percent investi-
gation fee, both of which were allowed by the statute. 
Since a total of 26 per cent was allowed to be deducted 
by the statute, the remainder to be delivered to the bor-
rower would amount to that percentage remaining, or 
7 4% of the note. Thus the $1020.00 actually delivere~ 
. to the borrower and received by him represented 74 per 
· cent of the face of the note. Therefore, by dividing 
$1020.00 by 74 and multiplying the quotient by 100, we 
arrive at 100 per eent of the face of the note or $1,378.38 . 
. To prove the accuracy of this calculation it is only 
necessary to reduce the face of the note by 26 per cent 
allowed to be deducted, thus arriving at the . $1020.00 
'vhich was the amount received by the borro,ver . 
. 
In the present case the application of the statute is 
exactly the same as in the Varney case. In both cases 
the charges were based upon the face of the note, and in 
both cases the amounts to be repaid were shown upon 
the face of the instruments as the amounts which the 
respective borrowers were obligated to repay in a given 
number of monthly installments, which monthly install-
ments were authorized by the statute. _The .only differ-
10 
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ence bet"'"een the two cases is that the defendants Wahlen 
in the present case wanted to receive a specified amount, 
and the face of the note had to be arrived at by calcula-
tion in order to leave the desired amount for delivery to 
defendants after making the rharges and interest deduc-
tions in the same manner as approYed by the Supreme 
Court in the Varney case. 
In the case at bar the statute expressly authorizes 
the taking of interest in advance and it is noted that that 
authorization applies to the particular class of lenders 
which qualify under the provisions of Title 7 of our Code. 
It is stipulated and a fact that plaintiff so qualifies and 
is entitled to the benefits of that particular statute. 
Accordingly our case is not governed by the general 
statutes on usury but by the particular provisions of 
Title 7, as stated by this Court in the Varney case. 
The application of the statute to the facts of the 
case at bar is very clear. Conformity was made very 
strictly to the provisions of the statute in the computa-
tion of the interest and charges made herein. This court 
has ruled on the validity and superceding effect of the 
statute a.s applied to Industrial Loan Companies, of 
'vhich plaintiff is a member. That decision also affirmed 
the application of the statute to a similar factual situa-
tion. There \vas no occasion for confusing interpretations 
of the statute in that case, as there are none in this case. 
The provisions of the statute are clear _and the· applica-
tion thereof to the facts in the case at bar is likewise 
clear. In such a situation there is no basis for a different 
11 
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interpretation, and certainly no ground for a forfeiture. 
Further, on the question of forfeiture, this Court 
said in the case of Rospigliosi vs. Glenallen Mining Co., 
et al., 69 Ut. 41, 252 Pac. 276, at Page 279: 
"It is true that it is the duty of courts to en-
force the plain intent of the statute when the 
parties entitled to the benefit of the statute ask 
for its protection. Courts do not, however, and 
ought not, so interpret a legislative act that the 
property of one citizen is forfeited and lost to 
another, unless the plain and unequivocal mandate 
of the Legislature admits of no other construc-
tion. '' 
In 25 Corpus Juris, Page 339, "Face Value" is de-
fined as, ''The valae·~xpt'e'Ssed on -the.~ face of·tt,· wr-iting 
in the.. commodity in whieh-· it .,is payable.'' 
In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 35, Page 382, 
''Face Value'' is defined as : 
''The value expressed on the face of a writing 
in the commodity in which it is payable; the value 
which can be ascertained from the language of 
the instrument without any aid from extrinsic 
facts Or evidence; and \Vhen applied to interest 
bearing notes and like instruments, the phrase has 
been held to me.:::tn the amount_n.amed .ont-the 
notes.'' 
The expression ''face amount of the loan'' was used 
in the California case of Connor vs. lVIinier, 288 Pac. 23, 
at Page 25, a case involving a note payable in the sum 
of $300~oo and ·wherein after· expense and interest ,vere 
12 
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deducted the sum of $270.00 cash was actually received. 
In that ease the ''face amount of the loan'' was the 
$300.00 as sho,vn to be payable by the express wording 
of the note. 
In the ease of Bowden vs. Gabel, (Mont.), 76 Pac. 
2nd 334, the expression ''face of the note'' was inter-
preted as being the amount sho,vn payable by the express 
wording of the note and was not the amount of inoney 
''Thich actually was received by the borrower. 
These two cases are cited on this point of definition 
of "face of loan" but are inapplicable on other points. 
POINT 4. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT AS PROPOSED IN 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF F AC.T. 
In plaintiff's proposed findings of fact found on 
Pages 9 A and B of the Transcript of Record, it was 
submitted that the following facts were stipulated and 
agreed to by counsel at the pre-trial. hearing and should 
be included in the findings of facts: 
"4 (b) That the banking commissioner of the 
State of Utah 'vould testify that the interest and 
charges made on the note involved herein con-
forms to the law and regulations of the State of 
Utah.'' 
"4 (c) That an officer of the plaintiff would tes-
tify that plaintiff relied on defendant's statement 
in the note as to his ownership of the mortgaged 
chattels.'' 
.13 
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The materiality of the stipulated fact relating to 
the testimony of the Banking Commissioner is shown by 
the Cobb vs. Hartenstein and the Culmer Paint and Glass 
Company vs. Gleason cases discussed hereafter. Since 
such stipulated testimony of the Banking Commissioner 
is material, it is submitted that it was error for the Court 
to refuse to amend the findings to include such statements. 
In Cobb vs. Hartenstein, Utah, 152 Pac. 424, the 
Supreme Court stated at page 427: 
''In short, the general rule of interpretation 
and construction of such contracts may be said 
to be that the contract is not usurious when it may 
be explained on any other hypothesis.'' 
The Court also cited a Kansas case with approval 
and added its own emphasis by saying: 
''Again, the existence of a usurious contract is 
never presumed. Where an agreement to pay 
interest is subject to two constructions, one of 
which would make it usurious, and the other not, 
the court will adopt the latter ... The burden is 
,upon the party seeking to impeach the transac-
.. ,,...,~:'/;tion to show guilty intent, and that the contract 
_ ivas a cover for usury." (Emphasis by Utah 
Court) 
The Court stated at Page 431: 
"In our judgment, the trial court was too 
g:ea~ly influenced by the fact that the plaintiff 
d1d, In fact, pay to the defendant more than the 
amount permitted by our statute. After the fact 
was · found the court see·mingly deduced every 
inference against the leg:;tlity of the-· transactions. 
14 
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No other conclusion is permissible. That view, as 
"'"e have seen is wholly repudiated by the courts. 
This case, therefore, affords another instance 
where too much stress is laid upon ex post facto 
acts and conduct.'' 
The Cobb case involved stock brokerage transactions, 
margins and similar transactions. The Court held that 
there was not sufficient intent on the part of the lender, 
and therefore no usury. 
In Culmer Paint and Glass Company vs. Gleason, 
(Utah), 130 Pac. 66, a case involving two· notes· and 
mortgages, on the subject of policy and construction, the 
court said, at page 68 : 
''Courts always---abhor··forfeitures, and -this is 
especially _true -of courts· of· equity. Forfeitures, 
therefore, especially such as have the effect. of 
taking property from one and giving it to another, 
should be enforced only when the proof is· elear 
and convincing, if not beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Counsel for appellant practically concede that by 
computing interest upon one method there is, per-
haps, no usury, but that, if it be computed upon 
another, then there is usury in the .transaction. 
This, to say the least, leave~ the matter in doubt, 
and in view of such doubt we ought not to enforce 
the forfeiture." 
Also, see Rospigliosi vs. Glenallen ~lining Company, 
supra. 
In the case at bar, the defendant contends that in-
terest should have been computed on the am~unt :Of cash 
received by the. defendant . and the amo~n~: :th:e!eof 
15 
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ADDED TO the cash received, the total thus derived 
being the amount of the note. This contention is dia-
metrically opposite to the express language of the 
statute which provides "and to DEDUCT interest 
thereon IN ADVANCE at the rate of one per cent or 
less of the FACE OF SUCH LOAN per month." By no 
interpretation or construction, however strained, can the 
language of the statute be said to contemplate a method 
of computation which embraces the principle of ADDING 
interest to arrive at the amount of the note. The con-
struction and computation contended for by the plaintiff 
follows the express provisions of the particular statute 
governing Industrial Loan Companies and is the only 
reasonable construction and computation possible under 
the language of the statute. There is nothing whatever 
to indicate that such construction was availed of for the 
purpose of evading the law. Therefore, it is respectfully 
submitted that no forfeiture should be declared in this 
case, and that the decision of the lower court should be 
reversed ·and plaintiff granted judgment. 
The stipulated testimony a.s to reliance by the plain-
tiff on defendant's statement in the note as to his owner-
ship of the mortgaged chattels is material as a basic fact 
supporting a judgment against the defendants which 
would not be dischargeable in bankruptcy, as having 
been secured by fraud of the defendants. Accordingly, 
such stipulation was material 'vhich should have been 
included in the amended findings. 
Section 17 of the National Bankruptcy Act relating 
to debts not affected by discharge, and particularly sub-
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section (2) provides that liabilities for obtaining money 
or property by false pretenses or false representations 
shall not be discharged. 
POINT 5. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO AMEND ITS JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
PLAINTIFF. 
POINT 6. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
TO GRANT JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF 
AND AGAINST DEFENDANTS. 
The judgment granted by the court in favor of de-
fendants was not based upon the facts and the law. The 
plaintiff was entitled to judgment, and the court erred 
in refusing to grant judgment in favor of plaintiff and 
against the defendants. 
The Court· also erred in refusing to amend its judg-
ment upon motion of plaintiff and grant judgment 1n 
favor of plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, this case involves a loan made under 
authority of the Industrial Loan Act of the State of 
Utah, with charges authorized by the express provisions 
of such act. It was also made in accordance with the 
construction and interpretation of such act heretofore 
made by this Court. Further, it conforms to the regu-
lations of the Banking Commissioner- of the State of 
Utah. Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the 
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loan herein was legal and valid and was not usurious, 
and that the decision of the lower court should be re-
versed and plaintiff granted judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOWARD N. JONES 
EKSAYN ANDERSON 
Attorn.eys for Appella;nt 
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